Humes Wide Construal of the Virtues Essay -- Hume Virtues Virtue Phil

Humes Wide Construal of the VirtuesABSTRACT The term virtue has traditionally been used to designate morally good character traits such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Although ethicists do not commonly offer a definitive list of virtues, the number of virtues discussed is often short and their moral significance is clear. Humes analysis of the virtues departs from this tradition both in monetary value of the quantity of virtues discussed and their obvious moral significance. A conservative estimate of the various virtues Hume refers to in his moral writings would put the number at around seventy, with the much untraditional ones including wit, good manners, and dialog. Unsurprisingly, Humes critics have attacked him for making nonsense of the concept of virtue by construing it so widely. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of virtue was controversial and he offered several defenses for it. After presenting the neglected attacks of his contemporaries al ong with Humes response, I argue that a problem remains by failing to distinguish mingled with degrees of virtue, Hume to a fault fails to distinguish between degrees of vice. But, some vices (e.g., malevolence) clearly deserve punishment whereas other alleged vices (e.g., uncleanliness) clearly do not. Thus, for adequate retribution, a distinction is needed between important and less important virtues and vices. I conclude that Hume could have used his own account of instinctive vengeance as a natural index number for distinguishing between important and unimportant vices. The term virtue has traditionally been used to designate morally good character traits such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Although ethicists, past and present, do ... ...f John Lelands A view of the principal deistical writers..., in the Monthly Review, 1757, Vol. 14, pp. 465-477, and in the Critical Review, 1756, Vol. 1, pp. 193-208.(12) James Beattie, Essay on the nature and immutabili ty of truth in opposition to sophistry and scepticism. 1770, Edinburgh, A. Kincaid and J. Bell, pp. 421-448.(13) Character of the Works of David Hume Esq, in The Weekly Magazine or Edinburgh Amusement, 1773, Vol. 22, pp. 233-234.(14) Tobias Simple, Strictures on the account of the life and writings of David Hume, in Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Review, 1777, Vol. 38, pp. 289-292.(15) C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, (New Haven 1944), pp. 34-35.(16) Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value, (Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press, 1966), pp. 160-161.(17) J. L. Mackie, Humes Moral Theory, (London Routledge, 1980), p. 129.